Tanzanian graduates with unpaid HESLB loans to be denied 'visas'

Graduates from higher learning education institutions who have not repaid their higher education loans will no longer get permits to travel outside Tanzania until they clear their debts.

The plan is to implement in joint efforts between the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training and the Immigration Department.

Deputy Minister for Education and Vocational Training, Jenister Mhagama, told the House: “We will not issue visas to graduates who have acquired loans from the Higher Education Students Loans Board (HESLB) and not settled the debts. “We are ready to bring to parliament a list of our plans to recover the loans…and we are determined to get the money back so that it may be used to educate other students.” She also said that ongoing issuance of national IDs will help HESLB track the defaulters.

She said the government is considering re-introduction the bond program that was in use in the early 1970s when the government used to sign special bonds with students to ensure that they work in the country for a specific period of time as repayment of their loans before they would be allowed to travel abroad for work.

The Deputy Minister was responding to a question by Namelock Sokoine (CCM-Special Seats) which was asked on her behalf by Betty Machangu (also CCM- Special Seats).

In her main question, Sokoine wanted to know whether the government had any plans to ensure that graduate teachers who have benefited from education loans do not leave the country without paying them back.

In a supplementary question, Machangu expressed concerns over HESLB’s failure to recover loans from graduates and inquired as to what plans the board has to do so efficiently.

In a related development, Mhagama said a total of 89,500 secondary school teachers are required in the country, but there are only 74,250 of them and to bridge this gap, the government is prioritizing loans to students seeking to become teachers.

SOURCE: THE GUARDIAN

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Author: Michael Knights
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Jul 01, 2011

The stabilization of Iraq has become wedged on a plateau, beyond which further improvement will be a slow process. According to incident metrics compiled by Olive Group, the average monthly number of insurgent attacks between January and June 2011 was 380.[1] The incident count in January was 376, indicating that incident levels remained roughly stable in the first half of 2011. One reason behind this stability is the ongoing virulence of northern and central Iraqi insurgents operating within Sunni Arab communities. Five predominately Sunni provinces and western Baghdad were responsible for an average of 68.5% of national incidents each month in 2011.[2]

This article argues that one driver for the ongoing resilience, or even revival, of Sunni militancy is the growing influence of the Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) movement, which has successfully tapped into Sunni Arab fear of Iraq’s Shi`a-led government and the country’s Kurdish population, while offering an authentic Iraqi alternate to al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI). The features of JRTN are becoming clearer, providing an interesting case study of an insurgent movement that learned from the mistakes of other militants and has successfully created a hybrid of Islamist themes and nationalist military expertise.

Birth and Evolution of JRTN

When JRTN formally announced its establishment after Saddam Hussein’s execution on December 30, 2006, the movement was initially a subject of curiosity because of its apparent connection to the Naqshbandi order of Sufi Islam. In fact, JRTN’s adoption of Naqshbandi motifs reflected patronage networks that coalesced during Saddam’s rule. In northern Iraq, the Naqshbandi order had many adherents, both Arab and Kurdish, but the most politically significant strand of the movement were Arabs who pragmatically collaborated with the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate and later the various Iraqi governments. According to Iraqi expert Professor Amatzia Baram, this Arab strand of Iraq’s Naqshbandis used the movement as a political and business fellowshipperhaps similar to freemasonryto advance their joint interests.[3] Under the Ba`athist regime, the Naqshbandi cultivated Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, Iraq’s vice president and deputy chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, as their sponsor. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, al-Duri was rushed through the process of confirmation as a Naqshbandi shaykh, officially connecting his spiritual lineage (silsilah) directly to the Prophet Muhammad.[4] Al-Duri initiated numerous military families into the Naqshbandi order during the Iran-Iraq War and throughout the gradual Islamification of the Ba`athist regime in the 1990s, using the order to strengthen his personal loyalty and patronage networks.[5]

The Naqshbandi layer of the former regime was not widely recognized during the early years of the insurgency in 2003-2005. Small hints of the use of Naqshbandi identity as a mobilizing principle began to surface in 2005 when insurgent katibat (battalions) emerged in Mosul and Kirkuk provinces bearing the name of Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani, the founder of the Qadiri order of Sufism, an order related to the Naqshbandi.[6] A number of events coincided in 2005-2006 to provide an opening for al-Duri and his supporters to develop an insurgent umbrella movement that blended Iraqi nationalism, protection of the Sunna (Iraq’s Sunni Arabs), and orthodox Islamic themes. During 2006, insurgent movements led by Iraqi Salafists (most notably the Islamic Army or Jaysh al-Islami) clashed with AQI and splintered. From 2006 onward, JRTN has contracted the services of many ailing Sunni insurgent groups.

The taped execution of Saddam Hussein by Shi`a militiamen in December 2006 provided a springboard for JRTN to announce its existence at the start of 2007. Against a backdrop of increasing sectarian violence, the manner of Saddam’s chaotic execution by hanging, a criminal’s death, prompted a wave of outrage and fear among former regime elements.[7] In early 2007, the growth of al-Duri’s ambitions led to a split in the New Ba`ath Party. One faction allied with Muhammad Younis al-Ahmed, a Saddam family consigliore with close ties to Syrian intelligence and with the al-Awda insurgent movement.[8] Others aligned with al-Duri, who formed the Higher Command for Jihad and Liberation (HCJL) in October 2007. Like the Islamic State of Iraqa coalition dominated by one large group, AQIHCJL is built almost entirely around JRTN. In the years after 2007, JRTN exploited the disintegration of other groupsincluding parts of AQIand grew in strength. It emerged as the only Iraqi insurgent group to have grown stronger during and since the U.S.-led “surge.” Indeed, U.S. statements on JRTN have arguably added to its credibility and potential for recruiting and fundraising.[9]

JRTN’s Organizational Structure

Estimates concerning the size of JRTN range from 1,500 to 5,000 members, but these figures do little to improve understanding of the concentric circles of involvement in such a movement.[10] According to multiple accounts, JRTN appears to have a small core of permanent members by design; outside of a compact national leadership, the only “card-carrying” members appear to be a cadre of facilitators, financiers, intelligence officers and trainers.[11] Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri is the leader of JRTN and HCJL, and he remains in adequate health and is politically active within Iraq.[12] His role in the organization is tending to the coalition of tribal and factional relationships, a role to which he is ideally suited by temperament and experience.[13] The national leadership of JRTN and the HCJL command staff are one and the same, with five main sub-sections: Military Affairs, Religious Affairs, Financial Affairs, Media, and Operational Security.[14]

JRTN’s mid-level operatives were initially drawn from a select group of former military and intelligence officers who had attained ranks between lieutenant colonel and brigadier general under the Ba`athist regime. The first cadres of JRTN operators appear to have been recruited primarily from former Republican Guard and military intelligence officers with connections to the pre-2003 Naqshbandi lodges within the Saddam military. Security personnel from Saddam’s inner-most circle were not favored due to their high profile.[15] The tribal make-up of JRTN mirrors the professional backgrounds of members, with a significant number of Jubburis from Hawija, Sharqat and Kirkuk; Ubaydis from Rashad and Tuz Khurmatu; Azzawis from Lake Hamrin and northern Diyala; and Harbis (including al-Duri’s tribal relatives) from Salah al-Din. In keeping with Saddam-era policies, a patchwork quilt of small sub-tribes and clans are aligned with JRTN, rather than entire federations or tribes.[16] Since 2009, the movement has gained significant strength in Abu Ghurayb and parts of the Falluja to Ramadi corridor.[17] Due to old Ba`athist ties to southern tribes, JRTN probably has the ability to conduct limited attacks in southern Iraq as well.[18]

JRTN sponsors large numbers of attack cells across northern and central Iraq to strike specified types of targets, almost always for payment on delivery of a video proving the attack was undertaken. In some cases, specific targets may also be identified by JRTN core members (particular bases, vehicle routes or persons). If necessary, JRTN may also provide access to weapons and explosives.[19] JRTN seems to carefully choose its “contractors” and even provides a degree of training and recruitment support to help form such cells. One U.S. intelligence officer described the trainers sent out as “mid-level guys in their early- to mid-30s with technical expertise in [improvised explosive devices, IEDs], sniping, things like that, farming out their knowledge into other areas of Iraq.”[20] JRTN prefers to use former members of elite military units such as the Special Republican Guard or Republican Guard as operational affiliates.[21] Candidates are identified by personal recommendations, and vetting is undertaken through former regime networks. Training programs are used to refresh military skills and discipline, including extended “90-day” courses where recruits are subjected to physical abuse by former warrant officers.[22]

Operators are slowly introduced to operational tasks, progressing from reconnaissance to simple attacks and finally to weapons caching and complex attacks.[23] Instruction to new cells stresses the need to adopt low-risk tactics (such as sniper fire and rocket attacks) to conserve personnel and to progressively adapt more complex attacks only after patiently profiling the enemy.[24] New members are assigned a serial number that is intended to be used in lieu of their name in communications.[25] JRTN likes to parade a ceremonial platoon of its soldiers in videos, stressing uniform elements of armament and clothing; its deployed cells are also given platoon, company, battalion and brigade designations, although the order of battle is not as structured as this nomenclature suggests.[26]

JRTN also appears to fully outsource some commissioned attacks to existing insurgent movements. In some cases, these are the remnants of formerly significant insurgent groups like Jaysh al-Islami, Hamas al-Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh Muhammad. The foot soldiers of these movements are often not informed by their leaders that JRTN contracted their services.[27] Some facilitators used by JRTN have operated with Ansar al-Sunna or AQI previously. This tactical “co-mingling” of groups is noted in numerous accounts.[28] JRTN appears to employ AQI to undertake deniable attacks on Iraqis, particularly civilian targets. In one well-known instance, JRTN contracted AQI to detonate a car bomb at the Ad Dawr Joint Control Center in December 2006, part of a successful strategy to eliminate all rivals to al-Duri’s sub-tribe in the area.[29] JRTN has also been linked to AQI car bombings in Ramadi, Kirkuk and Tikrit.[30] Some attacks by AQI have even been jointly claimed by JRTN.[31]

Population-Centric Insurgency

JRTN’s recruitment material and manifesto is a successful blend of political ideas with religious imagery. The key message of JRTN and HCJL communications is the need for unity among Sunni insurgent movements. In a June 2009 communiqué issued to celebrate the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri stressed the goal of “resistance unity on the battlefield.”[32] One U.S. officer noted: “We believe now that JRTN’s intent is to coalesce as many insurgent groups…under a common theme of removing the occupiers (the Coalition Forces) from Iraq and, second, to overthrow the government of Iraq for a Ba`athist regime or something similar.”[33] JRTN states that it would be willing to negotiate a cease-fire with the government of Iraq and the United States, but only once many of the changes wrought in Iraq since 2003 are reversed, including the unattainable stated aim of restoring all of the 600,000-odd security personnel to their former statuses and disestablishing all government organs and laws introduced since the occupation began.[34]

From the outset, JRTN appears to have tailored its strategic messaging and its operational activity to appeal to the population within its operational areas. With a significant nod to Islamic values, JRTN’s video productions have consistently focused on the concerns of mainstream Sunnis, such as the fear of an Iranian-influenced Shi`a government in Baghdad, concerns about Kurdish activities in the disputed areas (termed “the occupied territories” by JRTN), and general discontent about the apparent chaos and corruption since the end of Ba`athist rule.[35]

Alongside its messaging, JRTN has issued targeting guidance to differentiate itself from AQI, most notably a commitment to restrict attacks to “the unbeliever-occupier,” the JRTN descriptor for U.S. forces.[36] Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri stated in 2009, “all the fighting efforts are going to be directed totally against the invaders (the imperial American forces wherever they are on the Iraqi land), and we absolutely forbid killing or fighting any Iraqi in all the agent state apparatus of the army, the police, the awakening, and the administration, except in self-defense situations, and if some agents and spies in these apparatus tried to confront the resistance.” All attack videos publicized by JRTN exclusively show strikes on U.S. bases and forces; other types of attacks, such as JRTN’s numerous under-vehicle IED intimidation attacks on security forces, are disavowed.[37]

Integrated Kinetic and Information Operations

JRTN’s branding and messaging has yielded a number of significant advantages for the group. One private security analyst with access to U.S. and Iraqi Security Force officers stated: “At the operational level, JRTN’s appearance of a religious connection gives it credibility in the eyes of the population and therefore increases the support offered and reduces the interference by the local population.”[38] The analyst noted that JRTN’s stated “policy of only attacking the ‘occupiers’ and not the local population (whatever their ethnic or religious group) makes it one of the least ‘interfered with’ terrorist groupings. The population turned its back on many of the foreign fighters but JRTN are still seen as Iraqis first.”[39] In areas along the federal-Kurdish line of control, JRTN’s anti-Kurdish agitation may have assisted its penetration of Sunni security forces. Kurdish factions recently accused JRTN of influencing the 12th Iraqi Army division in southern Kirkuk and flying JRTN’s flag on Iraqi Army vehicles during anti-Kurdish protests.[40] Through sympathizers in the security forces, JRTN is assumed by U.S. officers to have at least some basic insight into the workings of joint U.S.-Iraqi operations centers, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and signals intelligence.[41]

The apparent focus on U.S. forces (plus its capacity to intimidate local judges and call upon tribal support) has earned the movement sympathetic treatment by some parts of the Iraqi security forces and judiciary. One intelligence officer from Diyala noted that his Iraqi counterparts “rarely stated in public that JRTN was much of a threat and every time we detained a JRTN leader, we had to fight tooth and nail to keep them detained. In other words they did not accept that JRTN was a serious risk to the [government of Iraq], only to Americans.”[42] JRTN appears to have successfully used loopholes in Iraqi law that means “resistance activities” are not treated as seriously as crimes with Iraqi victims. According to one analyst, this legal aspect “is one reason that [JRTN] is deliberately not leaving a trail of evidence and claims connecting it to car bombings or assassinations that target Iraqis.”[43]

Although opinions differ on the issue, most analysts seem to agree that JRTN is relatively well-funded compared to most Iraqi insurgent groups.[44] Localized extortion and intimidation is a mainstay for many Iraqi insurgent groups, including large segments of AQI, but JRTN appears to draw its funding primarily through top-down distribution of funds. Larger-scale contract and project-level business extortion may be a source, and JRTN also seems to draw on infusions of cash from major tribal figures in Iraq.[45] The former regime diaspora is an additional source of revenue, particularly former Republican Guard officers in Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Syria and Yemen.[46] JRTN’s energetic media campaign and its use of Islamic motifs has also allowed the movement to capture a strong share of the bigger, yet declining, slice of the external contributions coming to Iraq from “armchair jihadists” in the Gulf states. Some sources suggest that Arab intelligence services, notably the Jordanian General Intelligence Department, may be cultivating long-term ties with JRTN with an eye to countering Iranian influence in Iraq.[47]

Outlook for JRTN

JRTN, like its leader Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, is a chameleon, capable of assuming the form that will best serve its interests at the time. When Iraq’s Sunni insurgency was stricken by internal divisions between 2005 and 2009, JRTN emerged with a message of unity. When public support for the resistance was weakened by AQI’s actions against Iraqi Sunnis, JRTN committed itself to a public policy of not harming Iraqis whenever possible. The movement’s blend of Islamist and nationalist rhetoric and its appeal to Ba`ath-era nostalgia at a time of weak governance means it is squarely in-sync with the views of the population it relies upon for active and passive support. Yet the strategic landscape in Iraq is changing, not least due to the coming drawdown of U.S. forces. How will JRTN adapt to the potential forks in the road ahead?

One change factor could be the death or capture of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, quite possibly by natural causes due to his age and recurring health issues. Al-Duri is the last substantial link to the Ba`ath government and his leadership credentials are solid compared to other former regime elements. Nor is al-Duri lacking in vision, which he showed when he submitted letters to President George W. Bush and later President Barack Obama, was interviewed by Time Magazine, and had pronouncements read out at the Arab League despite his changed status since 2003.[48] Al-Duri is more than an important symbol of continuity since Saddam’s time: he is also a “quiet professional”a seasoned coalition-builder with unparalleled tribal and political ties in the Sunni community. His loss could cause cracks within the organization as its “spiritual center” is in his home town of Ad Dawr and in the Naqshbandi mosques he built there.[49]

The withdrawal of most or all U.S. forces could be another stressful transition for JRTN. The movement’s current raison d’êtreexpelling U.S. forcescould dry up in the coming six months. JRTN is already struggling to maintain the flow of new attack videos due to reduced availability of U.S. targets as bases shut down and convoy traffic declines, and this could stem the movement’s external fundraising. As a result, JRTN may evolve its concept of resistance until liberation. Since 2009, JRTN has slowly been moving the goalposts by parroting popular fears that Iraq’s Shi`a-led government is “basically a puppet of Iran and is trying to persecute Sunnis,” in the words of one U.S. officer.[50] A private security analyst who monitors JRTN communiqués noted that JRTN had “become a more anti-Baghdad organization than anti-American.”[51] JRTN is also likely to ramp up its anti-Kurdish rhetoric concerning the “occupied territories” along the federal-Kurdish line of control.

Many U.S. analysts relay a sense that JRTN is “playing the long game” or is “waiting us out.”[52] JRTN may shift its balance to non-U.S. targets in a switch toward the second of its stated aims: changing the nature of government in Iraq. This may result in a narrowing of its operations and use of affiliates and in greater numbers of deniable operations against Iraqis. Although its maximal aims are unachievable, it is conceivable that elements of JRTN could slip onto the edges of the political spectrum in Iraq as advocates of the Sunna who outwardly shed their affiliations to the Ba`ath Party and even al-Duri and JRTN.

The Ba`ath Partyincluding a young Izzat Ibrahim al-Durispent five years seeking to get back into power between 1963 and 1968. The process of recovering power was incremental and well-planned. It is difficult at the present time to assess the extent to which JRTN has contributed to the season of high-tempo assassinations in Baghdad, but a portion of the killings are probably traceable to the movement. This kind of carefully parsed violence that kills few but intimidates many is typical of the Ba`ath Party and may point to the future evolution of a slimmer, post-occupation JRTN movement.[53]

< em > Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has been writing on Iraq since the 1990s and is the author of four books and the editor of one anthology on Saddam-era and post-war Iraq. Dr. Knights has operated extensively in Iraq as the head of analysis at Olive Group, a security provider with over 3,000 days of consecutive operations in Iraq.

[1] All of the data in this article is drawn from Olive Group operations. Olive Group is a major private security company operating in Iraq.

[2] Ibid. The five predominately Sunni Arab provinces are Anbar, Salah al-Din, Mosul, Diyala and Kirkuk.

[3] Personal interview, Professor Amatzia Baram, Washington, D.C., February 10, 2011.

[4] Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq,” Terrorism Monitor 6:2 (2008). Without al-Duri’s assistance, the Naqshbandi would have been treated to the same intense surveillance and intimidation of other secret societies such as Iraq’s freemason lodges, which became dormant under the Ba`ath.

[5] Al-Duri is typically associated with the “Return to Faith” campaign of the early 1990s. In fact, al-Duri appears to have avoided the public spotlight entirely during this campaign. As Amatzia Baram noted, “Saddam was the ‘Mr Islam’: Izzat Ibrahim was ‘Mr Sufi.’ Al-Duri was always careful not to overshadow Saddam.” Personal interview, Professor Amatzia Baram, Washington, D.C., February 10, 2011.

[6] Ali, “Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq.” Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani formed the Qadira during the 11th century.

[7] Saddam had asked to be executed by firing squad. Many committed republicans and Ba`athists felt this was appropriate, to honor the office of the president if not Saddam himself. The manner of Saddam’s deathamidst Shi`a religious chantingwas taken as a sectarian affront by many Sunni Arabs. Personal interview, Professor Amatzia Baram, Washington, D.C., February 10, 2011.

[8] Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Reviving the Iraqi Ba’ath: A Profile of General Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad,” Terrorism Monitor 7:3 (2009).

[9] Since 2009, when JRTN was designated by the United States as a terrorist group, U.S. statements have had the unintended impact of boosting JRTN’s credentials. Alongside AQI, JRTN is the other main insurgent movement cited as a threat by U.S. officials, many of whom identify JRTN as the greater threat. One U.S. officer told Jane’s, “the US and other security forces potentially played into [JRTN’s] hands by building JRTN up to be stronger than they actually were.” See Jo Sharp, “Iraq’s Sufi-Baathist Insurgency,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, March 8, 2010. Also see “U.S. Treasury Department Freezes Assets of Iraqi Insurgent Group,” U.S. Treasury Department, December 23, 2009.

[10] The aforementioned Jane’s article refers to “1,500 to 2,000” members. The author has heard other estimates by U.S. military officers that range from 3,000 to 5,000 members of various kinds.

[11] Personal interviews, U.S. intelligence analysts, Skype, telephone and face-to-face interviews, dates and locations withheld at the request of interviewees.

[12] Ibid. Al-Duri’s credentials within the Ba`athist milieu cannot be overstated. From 1963 to 1968, al-Duri was Saddam’s shadow, serving with him in the intelligence and peasants sections of the Ba`ath Party and later spending time in jail together. From the Ba`ath return to power in 1968 until the regime’s fall in 2003, al-Duri served as Saddam’s most trusted deputy, being careful not to threaten Saddam’s position. The relationship was not even weakened when al-Duri’s daughter divorced Saddam’s son Uday.

[13] Al-Duri’s special skill was always in the field of relationship-building. While others in the progressive Ba`athist government sneered at religious and tribal powerbrokers in the first decades of Ba`ath rule, al-Duri was busy forging long-term links to sects and tribes across Iraq. Despite his limited military background, al-Duri mixed well with professional soldiers during his long tenure as deputy commander of Iraq’s armed forces.

[14] Abdul Hameed Bakier, “Ex-Baathists Turn to Naqshbandi Sufis to Legitimize Insurgency,” Terrorism Focus 5:1 (2008).

[15] Only a small number of Special Republican Guard, Special Security Organization (Amn al-Khass), and Presidential Guard (himaya) have been associated with JRTN. Intelligence personnel in JRTN tend to be from the military intelligence or general intelligence rather than Saddam’s creation, the Mukhabarat. Saddam Fidayin, widely disliked by Iraqi military men, were also not included in JRTN’s core personnel.

[16] Saddam’s own tribe, the Albu Nasir, does not appear to be strongly involved in JRTN.

[17] Personal interviews, U.S. intelligence analysts, Skype, telephone and face-to-face interviews, dates and locations withheld at the request of interviewees.

[18] Many former Ba`athists and Ba`athist-affiliated tribal shaykhs lost status after 2003 and continue to be legally ostracized by the Islamist parties in the south. These outcasts sometimes assist former regime elements in carrying out attacks in the south, such as the attacks over the last year in Basra Province. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri also maintained close ties with a number of southern tribes, to whom he acted as benefactor during the Saddam years.

[19] Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, date withheld at the request of interviewee.

[20] Sharp.

[21] Colonel Mike Marti, “Intelligence Operations in Iraq,” U.S. Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable, May 19, 2010.

[22] Ibid. Also drawn from personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, date and location withheld at the request of interviewee.

[23] Personal interview, private security analyst with access to Iraqi brigade tactical operation centers in northern Iraq, March 27, 2011.

[24] Bakier.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, date and location withheld at the request of interviewee.

[27] A U.S. soldier told a reporter, “Sometimes some of the groups perceive, in fact, that they’re working for their organization only to discover later that several tiers up they are actually being facilitated by another.” For details, see Richard Tomkins, “Analysis: Baathists Beat Nationalist Drum,” UPI, June 5, 2009. This is echoed in Sharp.

[28] A good example is the interview by U.S. Army Brigadier General Craig Nixon, who is quoted in Quil Lawrence, “US Sees New Threat In Iraq From Sufi Sect,” National Public Radio, June 17, 2009.

[29] Lieutenant Colonel Pat Proctor, “Fighting to Understand: A Practical Example of Design at the Battalion Level,” Military Review, March-April 2011. Also see reference to this incident in Sharp.

[30] For an official statement on a JRTN and al-Qa`ida-affiliated suicide bomb cell, see “Suspected VBIED Cell Leader Arrested in Sulaymaniyah,” Multinational Force-Iraq, March 2, 2010. Car bombings in Kirkuk and Tikrit in 2011 have also been linked to JRTN funding. This information is based on personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, date withheld at the request of interviewee.

[31] The attack in question was the July 29, 2010 daylight storming and capture of an Iraqi Army checkpoint in Adhamiya, Baghdad. See Hayder Najm, “Al-Qaeda Maintains its Foothold,” Niqash, August 11, 2010.

[32] Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, “Message Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri Supreme Commander of the Fight and Liberation. The end of June 2009,” Jabha-wqs.net, June 30, 2009.

[33] Richard Tomkins, “Ba’athists Aiding Insurgent Attacks,” Washington Times, June 4, 2009.

[34] “Iraqi Resistance Announces Founding of Supreme Command for the Jihad and Liberation in Baghdad,” alBasrah.net, October 3, 2007.

[35] Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, “Letter from the Jehad Leader of the Iraqi Resistance Izzat Ibrahim ad-Duri,” Jabha-wqs.net, May 29, 2005.

[36] The main JRTN tactics used are long-range harassing tactics such as rocket fire on U.S. bases and sniper attacks, or the use of command wire-initiated roadside bombs. JRTN affiliates make use of hand-thrown armor-piercing RKG-3 grenades and have occasionally experimented with armor-piercing roadside bombs related to explosively-formed projectiles. This information is based on personal interview, private security contact, May 12, 2011.

[37] In fact, JRTN appears to spend considerable resources on kinetic forms of counterintelligence, targeting judges, police officers and the Sons of Iraq with warnings followed by progressively deadly uses of force. In keeping with Ba`athist practices, JRTN uses not only terrorism, but also enticement: many police officers in strongholds like Ad Dawr receive “two pay checks”their federal and JRTN stipendsaccording to U.S. officers quoted in Sharp. In the autumn of 2010, JRTN undertook a “concerted campaign to overawe Iraqi Army forces in west Baghdad” through massed employment of under-vehicle IEDs, according to a private security contact interviewed by the author in May 2011.

[38] Personal interview, private security analyst, March 27, 2011.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Personal interview, Kurdistan Regional Government counterterrorism intelligence analyst, Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, May 21, 2011.

[41] “Partnerships,” Warhorse Intel Blog, September 17, 2010.

[42] “Seriously, I just need to let Diyala go,” Warhorse Intel Blog, January 22, 2011.

[43] Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, date withheld at the request of interviewee.

[44] For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Catlett, commander of a U.S. battalion in the JRTN heartland of Hawija, stated that the movement was “very well-funded.” For details on his statement, see Michael Gisick, “US Targeting Insurgent Group in N. Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, May 25, 2010.

[45] Personal interviews, U.S. intelligence analysts, dates withheld at the request of interviewees.

[46] Ibid. For background on the amount of money held by former regime elements abroad, see Michael Knights, “The Role Played by Funding in the Iraq Insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2005.

[47] “Dancing with Wolves: Maliki’s Envoys Take the Pulse of Baathists and Generals Outside Iraq,” Gulf States Newsletter, May 4, 2009.

[48] “The Next Insurgency: Baathists and Salafis Pool Resources to Fight Iraqi Government,” Gulf States Newsletter, September 17, 2010.

[49] “Phase Used in Proctor, Fighting to Understand,” Military Review, March-April 2011.

[50] Sharp.

[51] Personal interview, private security analyst, May 10, 2011.

[52] Personal interview, private security analyst, March 27, 2011. Also see Colonel Burt Thompson, quoted in Tomkins, “Analysis: Baathists Beat Nationalist Drum.”

[53] Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri laid out the rationale for counter-stability targeting when he stated: “Kill the traitors and stooges, pursue them and strike them down. Do not allow for any stability, because stability serves the enemy and his puppets.” See al-Duri, “Letter from the Jehad Leader of the Iraqi Resistance Izzat Ibrahim ad-Duri.”

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Mnamo tarehe 03 Septemba mwaka 2012, Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi, Mhe. Dkt. Emmanuel Nchimbi (MB) aliteua Kamati ya watu watano kufanya uchunguzi kuhusiana na kifo cha mwandishi wa habari wa kituo cha televisheni cha Channel Ten, marehemu Daud Mwangosi, kilichotokea tarehe 02 Septemba 2012, katika Kijiji cha Nyololo,Wilaya ya Mufindi, Mkoa wa Iringa. Kituo cha kazi cha marehemu Daud Mwangosi kilikuwa mkoa wa Iringa ambapo pia alikuwa Mwenyekiti wa Klabu ya Waandishi wa Habari wa Mkoa wa Iringa (IPC).

Wajumbe wa Kamati hiyo ni:

Jaji (Mst.) Steven Ihema – Mwenyekiti

Bibi Pili Mtambalike – Mjumbe

Kanali (Dkt. Eng) Wema Wilson Wekwe – Mjumbe

Bwana Theophil Makunga – Mjumbe

Naibu Kamishna wa Polisi Issaya Juma. Mngulu – Katibu

Sekretarieti ya Kamati ni:

Bi. Edith T. Assenga – Wizara ya Mambo ya Ndani

Bwana Nasoro H. Msumi – Wizara ya Mambo ya Ndani

2.0 HADIDU ZA REJEA

Kamati ilipewa Hadidu za rejea zifuatazo:

- Uhalali wa mkusanyiko ulioitishwa na CHADEMA eneo la Nyololo,Wilaya ya Mufindi, Mkoa wa Iringa tarehe 02 Septemba, 2012 na kuwepo kwa uvunjifu wa amani.

- Kama yalikuwepo makubaliano au maelekezo kuhusu mikutano ya hadhara au maandamano nchini katika kipindi cha Sensa.

-Mazingira yaliyosababisha Jeshi la Polisi kutumia nguvu iliyosababisha kifo cha Marehemu Daud Mwangosi na wengine kuumizwa, na uwiano wa nguvu hiyo na tukio.

-Madai ya kuwepo uhasama kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Waandishi wa Habari Mkoa wa Iringa na chanzo cha uhasama huo. Aidha kuna madai ya kuwepo kwa orodha ya waandishi watatu (3) ambao Jeshi la Polisi limepanga kuwashughulikia.

-Uwepo wa Sheria, Kanuni au Taratibu zinazotoa uwezo kwa Jeshi la Polisi kuzuia mikusanyiko inayoitishwa na Vyama vya Siasa na Mamlaka ya Rufaa endapo vyama hivyo havitaridhika na amri hizo.

-Hali ya Mahusiano kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Vyama vya Siasa nchini katika Utendaji kazi wao na Utii wa Sheria.

3.0 MUDA WA UCHUNGUZI

Kamati ilipewa muda wa siku 19 kuanzia tarehe 11 Septemba 2012 iwe imekamilisha uchunguzi na kuwasilisha Ripoti yake ifikapo tarehe 02 Oktoba 2012.

4.0 NJIA ZILIZOTUMIKA KUFANYA UCHUNGUZI:

4.1 Mahojiano na watu mbalimbali waliokuwepo kwenye tukio.

4.2 Kupitia nyaraka na vielelezo mbalimbali.

4.3 Kutembelea eneo la tukio.

4.4 Majadiliano na vikundi mbalimbali (viongozi wa dini ngazi ya kijiji na wilaya hadi ya mkoa; viongozi wa vyama vya siasa kwenye ngazi ya kijiji, wilaya, mkoa na Taifa, viongozi wa serikali ngazi ya kijiji, wilaya, mkoa, Taifa) na wanakijiji wa Nyololo.

5.0 UCHUNGUZI

Kamati ya Uchunguzi ilifanya mahojiano na watu mbalimbali ikiwa pamoja na watendaji wa serikali hususan Kamati za Ulinzi na Usalama ngazi ya wilaya Mufindi na mkoa wa Iringa viongozi wa Jeshi la Polisi viongozi wa vyama vya Siasa, Viongozi wa Madhehebu ya Dini, Waandishi wa Habari na wananchi wa kawaida (ngazi ya Kijiji, Kata, Wilaya, Mkoa na Taifa).

6.0. YALIYOJITOKEZA

Baada ya Kamati kukutana na makundi ya watu mbalimbali katika Mkoa wa Iringa na Viongozi wa Vyama vya Siasa wa kitaifa jijini Dar es Salaam, mambo kadhaa yalijitokeza na baadhi yao ni:

-Hofu ya kutoweka kwa amani miongoni mwa viongozi na wananchi hasa katika mikutano na maandamano ya siasa ambayo yameanza kuota mizizi ya uvunjifu wa amani na mengine kusababisha mauaji. Viongozi na wananchi wengi waliotoa maoni yao mbele ya Kamati wameonyesha hofu kuwa hali hiyo isipodhibitiwa mapema inaweza kulipeleka pabaya Taifa letu.

-Kuna walakini wa mahusiano kati ya waandishi wa habari na Jeshi la Polisi mkoani Iringa.

-Uwepo wa utashi wa makusudi/dhati kwa viongozi wa vyama vyote vya siasa kuweka mbele maslahi ya taifa badala ya maslahi ya vyama.

-Umuhimu wa Ushirikiano na mahusiano baina ya vyombo vya serikali, vyama vya siasa, wanahabari na wananchi kwa ujumla badala kuonyeshana ubabe ambao umetufikisha hapo.

- Haja ya kufanya mabadiliko ya kisheria katika mfumo wa usimamizi na utendaji wa masuala ya siasa nchini

- Haja ya kuwa na mabadiliko ya kimfumo katika Jeshi la Polisi badala ya ulioko sasa ambao kwa maoni ya baadhi ya watu waliozungumza na Kamati ni wa kitaifa zaidi na kuacha serikali za mitaa bila ya wajibu wa kulinda usalama wa raia na mali zao.

-Kwamba nguvu kubwa inatumika na vyombo vya dola/usalama dhidi ya raia na hivyo kupunguza imani ya jamii kwa vyombo hivyo.

-Kupungua kwa maadili/uzalendo miongoni mwa Watanzania kuanzia viongozi hadi wananchi hususan kwenye shughuli za kisiasa.

-Haja ya kusisitiza elimu ya uraia kwa jamii kuanzia kwa watoto hadi kwa watu wazima hasa wakati huu wa mfumo wa vyama vingi ili kujenga umoja wa kitaifa.

-Kuwepo kwa mikutano na maandamano ya vyama vya siasa yasiyokuwa na kikomo.

-Muonekano wa Jeshi la Polisi mbele ya jamii.

7.0. MATOKEO YA UCHUNGUZI KUTOKANA NA HADIDU ZA REJEA

7.1 Kuhusu “Uhalali wa mkusanyiko ulioitishwa na CHADEMA eneo la Nyololo, Wilaya ya Mufindi Mkoa wa Iringa tarehe 02 Septemba 2012 na kuwepo uvunjifu wa amani”, uchunguzi wa Kamati umebaini yafuatayo:

Tarehe 30 Agosti 2012 CHADEMA iliandika barua, Ofisi ya Mkuu wa Polisi Wilaya ya Mufindi kutoa taarifa kuhusu ratiba ya mikutano ishirini na sita (26) kwenye majimbo ya Mufindi Kusini na Kaskazini tarehe 02-03 Septemba 2012. Awali ratiba ya mikutano hiyo ilikubaliwa, lakini baadaye siku hiyo ya tarehe 01 Septemba 2012 mikutano hiyo ilisitishwa kwa barua Kumb. Na MFG/A.24/9/54 kutokana na kuongezwa siku za zoezi la Sensa ya watu na Makazi hadi tarehe 08 Septemba 2012.

CHADEMA walikataa kusitisha ratiba ya mikutano hiyo kama inavyothibitishwa na Justin Leornard Mpotwa Katibu wa Wilaya ya Mufindi kwa barua yake Kumb. Na CDM/M4/002/Vol.01/2012 ya tarehe 01 Septemba 2012 kuwa “pia tunaomba ieleweke bayana kwamba kisheria shughuli zetu hazina mwingiliano na wala kuhusiana na program iliyoongezwa ya Sensa. Kwa barua hii tunakuarifu kuwa mikutano tuliyokutaarifu kuifanya kuanzia kesho tarehe 02 septemba 2012 itaendelea kama ilivyopangwa – CHADEMA VEMA”.

Aidha kuwepo kwa zuio la mikutano ya Siasa ya CHADEMA Mkoani Iringa wakati wa zoezi la Sensa ya Watu na Makazi linathibitishwa na Amri ya Utendaji (Operation Order) ya Kamanda wa Polisi Mkoa (SACP Michael Kamuhanda) ya tarehe 01 Septemba 2012. Amri ya Utendaji ambayo ni amri halali ilitolewa ili “kuzuia shughuli za Siasa (mikutano na maandamano) kipindi cha zoezi la kitaifa la Sensa kuanzia tarehe 25 Agosti 2012 hadi 08 Septemba 2012”. Uhalali wa Amri/Zuio hili ulithibitishwa pia na Msajili wa Vyama vya Siasa nchini katika barua yake Kumb Na. DA. 112/ 123/ 01/ 34 ya tarehe 28/08/2010 na wakati wa mahojiano na Kamati ya uchunguzi tarehe 22 Septemba 2012.

Licha ya zuio/amri hii Viongozi wa CHADEMA walikataa kutii amri hiyo. Kutokana na taarifa hizi, Kamati ya Uchunguzi inathibitisha kwamba hapakuwepo na uhalali wa mkusanyiko/mkutano ulioitishwa na CHADEMA eneo la Nyololo, Wilaya ya Mufindi, Mkoa wa Iringa tarehe 02 Septemba 2012. Kuhusu kuwepo kwa uvunjifu wa amani Kijijini Nyololo tarehe 02 Septemba 2012 Kamati ya Uchunguzi ilibaini mambo yafuatayo:

-Tukio la kuuawa kwa Daud Mwangosi jioni ya tarehe 02 Septemba 2012 lilitokea baada ya Operesheni ya Jeshi la Polisi kumalizika. Hii ni kwa mujibu wa maelezo ya Kamanda wa Polisi Mkoa wa Iringa, Mkuu wa Kikosi cha Kutuliza Ghasia Mkoa wa Iringa na Joseph Senga Mpiga picha/Mwandishi Tanzania Daima.

- Kitendo cha kutotii amri halali ya Kamanda wa Polisi kuagiza wafuasi wa CHADEMA watawanyike kutoka kwenye eneo la ofisi ya Kata ya CHADEMA ilikuwa chanzo cha vurugu.

Uamuzi wa CHADEMA kung’ang’ana kukusanyika isivyo halali eneo la Nyololo ikizingatiwa kuwepo kwa ujumbe wa SMS kutoka kwa Dkt. Slaa, Katibu wa CHADEMA uliosema, “IGP nasubiri simu yako. Wajulishe Polisi wako waandae risasi za kutosha, mabomu ya kutosha. Mtakuwa na karamu ya mauaji na kisha kusherehekea, mjiandae kwa kwenda mahakama ya Den Hague. Ni afadhali tufe kuliko manyanyaso haya”. Dr. Slaa. : ujumbe huu ukiashiria umwagaji wa damu ni ushaidi tosha kuwepo kwa uvunjifu wa amani. CHADEMA ndiyo Chanzo cha vurugu na uvunjifu wa amani Kijijini Nyololo tarehe 02 Septemba 2012.

7.2 Kama yalikuwepo makubaliano kuhusu mikutano ya hadhara au maandamano nchini katika kipindi cha Sensa. Katika kuzungumzia hoja hii tukianzia na Uongozi wa Serikali na Vyama vya Siasa ngazi ya Wilaya, Mkoa hadi Taifa, Kamati ya Uchunguzi ilithibitisha kuwepo kwa maagizo ya kusimamisha mikutano/maandamano ya Vyama vya Siasa wakati wa kipindi cha Sensa ya Watu na Makazi yaliyotolewa na Msajili wa Vyama vya Siasa nchini, na kuongezwa muda wa Sensa hadi tarehe 08 Septemba 2012 na Kamishna wa Sensa hapo tarehe 01 Septemba 2012.

Aidha hoja hii imethibitika kwamba Msajili wa Vyama vya Siasa nchini kwa barua yake yenye Kumb Na DA. 112/ 01/ 34 ya terehe 28 Agosti 2012 kwenda kwa Makatibu Wakuu wa Vyama vya Siasa akiwasihi kusimamisha shughuli zote za mikutano na maandamano ya Vyama vyao kwa kipindi chote cha Sensa ya Watu na Makazi. Aidha kwa mujibu wa Gazeti la Serikali Na 29 VOL 93 ya tarehe 20 Julai 2012, Mhe. Rais, JAKAYA MRISHO KIKWETE kwa mamlaka aliyopewa chini ya kifungu namba 14 cha Sheria ya Takwimu sura 351 alielekeza kwamba Sensa ya Watu na Makazi itafanyika kuanzia tarehe 26 mwezi wa nane, mpaka tarehe 08 mwezi wa tisa mwaka 2012.

Kamishna wa Sensa aliratibu zoezi la Sensa ya Watu na Makazi kumalizika ifikapo tarehe 01 Septemba 2012. Hata hivyo kutokana na tathmini aliyofanya, kazi hiyo ilikuwa imekamilika kwa asilimia 95%. Hivyo tarehe 01 Septemba 2012 alitoa taarifa kwa Vyombo vya Habari kwamba ili kila mwananchi apate nafasi ya kuhesabiwa watu watakaokuwa wamesalia ambao ni chini ya 5% wanaombwa kutoa ushirikiano ili zoezi hili likamilike. Hivyo, wale wote mmoja mmoja waliobakia wataendelea kuandikishwa hadi tarehe 08 Septemba 2012.

Kwa upande wake Inspekta Jenerali wa Polisi kwa ujumbe wa simu Kumb Na S8.7/ 2/ A/ VOL XIV/ 59 ya tarehe 28/08/2012, pia simu yake Kumb Na C.28/ B/ 44 ya terehe 01/ 09/ 2012 aliwaelekeza Makamanda wa Polisi wa Mikoa kutoruhusu mikutano na maandamano wakati huu wa zoezi la Sensa ya Watu na Makazi mpaka litakapokamilika tarehe 08 Septemba 2012.

Kimsingi Kamati ya uchunguzi imethibitisha kwamba maelekezo kwa Vyama vya Siasa kutoendesha shughuli za mikutano ya hadhara au maandamano yalitolewa kwa mujibu wa Sheria.

7.3 Mazingira yaliyosababisha Jeshi la Polisi kutumia nguvu iliyosababisha, kifo cha marehemu Daud Mwangosi na wengine kuumizwa, na uwiano wa nguvu hiyo na tukio.

Hoja kuwa Polisi walitumia nguvu kubwa katika kudhibiti mkutano wa CHADEMA iliungwa mkono na Viongozi wa Serikali ya Kijiji, Viongozi wa dini na Viongozi wa siasa Kijijini Wilayani na Mkoani pamoja na Waandishi wa Habari. Hata hivyo Kamati za Ulinzi na Usalama Wilaya na Mkoa na Viongozi wa Jeshi la Polisi waliona nguvu hizo ni za mazingira ya hali ilivyokuwa.

Uchunguzi wa suala hili umebaini kwamba tarehe 02 Septemba 2012 muda wa saa 10 za jioni huko eneo la Sokoni, Kijiji cha Nyololo kulikuwepo na mkutano usio halali ulioandaliwa na viongozi wa CHADEMA. Upo ukweli kwamba uongozi wa Polisi ulitoa ilani kuamuru wafuasi wa CHADEMA waliokuwepo mkutanoni hapo waondoke la sivyo nguvu itatumika. Walikaidi amri hiyo na ilipoagizwa viongozi wakamatwe ndipo walianza kurusha mawe kwa Askari Polisi. Baadhi ya Askari walijeruhiwa, akiwamo G 9934 PC Mgaka alivunjwa mkono wa kulia. Pia kofia (helmet) tatu ziliharibiwa.

Kutokana na hali hiyo amri ya kupiga mabomu ya machozi na ya kishindo ilitolewa, kwa mujibu wa Kifungu 77 hadi 79 cha Kanuni za Adhabu, Sura ya 16 – R.E 2002. Operesheni hii ilimalizika baada ya kukamatwa viongozi na wafuasi wa CHADEMA jumla yao saba.

Baada ya zoezi hilo kukamilika Askari Polisi walioshiriki kwenye Operesheni waliamriwa kuingia katika magari tayari kwa kuondoka. Wakati Askari wakipanda kwenye magari kishindo kikubwa kilitokea umbali wa zaidi ya mita 100 kutoka sehemu ambayo operesheni ilikuwa inafanyika na iligundulika kwamba kishindo kile kimesababisha kifo cha Mwandishi wa Habari Daud Mwangosi.

Upelelezi wa awali pamoja na picha za mnato unaonyesha kwamba marehemu alikuwa amemkumbatia Mkuu wa Polisi Kituo cha Mafinga ASP Assel Mwampamba na huku akiwa amezungukwa na Askari Polisi wasiopungua sita ambao licha ya kumzunguka marehemu Daud Mwangosi kuna madai yaliyotolewa na mwandishi wa Habari Joseph Senga kwamba, Askari Polisi hao walikuwa wanamshambulia marehemu kwa kumpiga, ndipo askari mmoja aliyetambuliwa kuwa ni G 2573 PC Pasificus Cleophace Simon alifyatua Bomu la kishindo na kusababisha kifo cha Daud Mwangosi.

Tukio hili linaweza kugawanyika katika sehemu mbili: sehemu ya kwanza ni wileamapamebas(mni ya kutawanya watu na ya pili ni ile ya mauaji ya Daud Picha Namba 15: Askari Polisi wakimpiga Marehemu Daud Mwangosi, huku OCS M wenye kifimbo) akijaribu kuwazuia. Mwangosi. Katika tukio la kwanza idadi ya Askari walioshiriki ni Sekisheni Tukio hili linaweza kugawanyika katika sehemu mbili: sehemu ya kwanza ni lile ya Operesheni ya kutawanya watu na ya pili ni ile ya mauaji ya Daud Mwangosi.

 Katika tukio la kwanza idadi ya Askari walioshiriki ni Sekisheni tatu ambapo ni askari wasiozidi thelathini. Kwa maelezo yaliyotolewa na Mwandishi wa Habari mbele ya Kamati, Bw Joseph Senga anaeleza kuwa watu walishatawanyika na hali kutulia mara baada ya Operesheni hii kukamilika na Polisi kujiandaa kuondoka kwenye eneo la tukio. Tukio la mauaji ya Daud Mwangosi lilisababishwa na kupigwa bomu la kishindo.

Maswali ya kujiuliza katika tukio la mauaji ni Je, kulikuwepo na uwiano unaolingana na tukio hili?, Je Palikuwa na uhalali wa kutumia Bomu la kishindo?, na Je, utumiaji wa Bomu hilo ulikuwa na umuhimu?

Kulingana na tukio lenyewe majibu ya maswali hayo ni kama ifuatavyo:

-Hapakuwa na uwiano wa Bomu na tukio la mauaji, kwa vile utaratibu wa matumizi ya bomu hilo unaelekeza kulenga juu usawa wa nyuzi 45 na umbali mita 80 mpaka mita 100.

-Hapakuwa na uhalali wa kutumia Bomu la Kishindo kwani lengo la ulipuaji wake ni ili watu waogope na kukimbia.

- Hapakuwepo umuhimu wa kutumia Bomu la Kishindo kwa sababu hata ingekuwa ukamataji tayari Askari Polisi wapatao sita walikuwepo eneo la tukio.

Kwa misingi hiyo Kamati imeona kwamba nguvu iliyotumika mwanzo hadi kumaliza Operesheni haikuwa kubwa. Kuhusu tukio la kuuawa Bw. Daud Mwangosi na kuumizwa baadhi ya Askari Polisi halikustahili kabisa.

7.4 Madai ya kuwepo uhasama kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Waandishi wa Mkoa wa Iringa na chanzo cha uhasama huo. Aidha madai ya kuwepo kwa orodha ya waandishi watatu (3) ambao Jeshi la Polisi limepanga kuwashughulikia.

Katika kupata ukweli wa jambo hili, Kamati ilikutana na wanachama wa Klabu ya Waandishi wa Habari Iringa na pia iliwahoji Kamanda wa Polisi wa Mkoa wa Iringa, Michael Kamuhanda, Mkuu wa Upelelezi wa Mkoa, Nyigesa Ramadhani Wankyo na Mkuu wa Kikosi cha Kutuliza Ghasia mkoani Iringa Said Abdallah Mnunka.

Pia, wakati Kamati inakutana na Kamati ya Ulinzi na Usalama ya Mkoa, ilileta suala la mahusiano kati ya Polisi na waandishi wa habari na watendaji wakuu wa serikali wa mkoa wa Iringa.

Katika mkutano na waandishi wa habari, ilionekana kuwa katika thathmini yao uhusiano kati yao na Polisi hapo mkoani ni mbaya sana. Walieleza matukio kadhaa ya kunyanyaswa waandishi wa habari wakati wapo kazini, ikiwamo kupigwa, kutishiwa kuharibiwa na kuharibiwa vifaa vyao vya kazi na hata kutishiwa maisha ili wasiripoti mambo ambayo Polisi wana maslahi nayo.

Kwa mfano, mwandishi wa habari wa Star TV, Oliver Moto alieleza Kamati kuwa: “Waandishi wa habari hawana mahusiano mazuri na Jeshi la Polisi, na hata wanapofika ofisi za Polisi huwa hawapewi ushirikiano. Kutokana na uhusiano mbaya wanahabari walifanya maandamano tarehe 06 Machi 2012 kupinga unyanyasaji wanaofanyiwa na Jeshi la Polisi hapa Iringa”.

Mwandishi mwingine wa habari Zulfa Shomari ambaye anaandikia gazeti la Mwananchi alieleza kuwa kuna matukio kadhaa ambayo Polisi wamewazuia waandishi kufanya kazi zao mojawapo ni lile ambalo Polisi walikataza kupigwa picha tukio la kukamatwa kwa pembe za ndovu.

Kamati pia iielezwa na mwandishi wa habari wa ITV, Bw. Laurian Mkumbata mkasa wa kuvunjwa kamera yake na OCD Iringa kwenye tukio moja. Ilibidi OCD alipe kamera hiyo kwa maagizo ya RPC.

Pia walisema kuwa Kamanda wa Polisi wa Mkoa hivi sasa ana mawasiliano duni sana na waandishi wa habari na juhudi za wengi wao kumfuata ili athibitishe tukio zimekuwa zikishindwa kwani ameweka maagizo getini kuwa mtu yeyote ambae anataka kumuona ni lazima aeleze anataka kumuona kwa sababu gani ndipo aruhusiwe kuingia. Kwa sababu hii waandishi wa habari wengi wamekata mguu kwenda ofisini kwake.

Mwandishi mmoja wa Ebony FM Bw. Raymond Francis, aliiambia Kamati kuwa yeye binafsi alitishiwa kuuawa na baada ya kuandaa kipindi kuhusiana na watu wanaoshukiwa kufanya biashara haramu ya madawa ya kulevya ambao wanahusiana na baadhi ya Polisi wasio waadilifu.

 Mwandishi wa Habari Greyson Mgoi wa gazeti la Kwanza Jamii aliiambia Kamati kuna tukio la kuanguka kwa lori la mafuta eneo la Ifunda karibu na Mafinga ambapo waliwakuta wananchi na polisi wakichota mafuta kutoka kwenye hilo gari.

Alisema kuwa waliamua kupiga picha tukio hilo lakini Polisi waliwakamata na kuwalazimisha wafute hizo picha walizopiga. Kwa kuogopa shari walikubali kuzifuta na wakaruhusiwa kuendelea na safari yao.

Waandishi wa Habari hata hivyo walibainisha kuwa uhusiano wao na Polisi hapo mkoani ulikuwa mzuri sana kipindi cha uongozi wa RPC Advocate Nyombi. Walisema kuwa wakati wa RPC Nyombi, alikuwa na utaratibu wa kukutana na waandishi wa habari na pia alikuwa anafikiwa na waandishi wa habari kwa urahisi kwa simu au ofisini kwake. Walisema lakini ulianza kuharibika alipohama na nafasi yake kuchukuliwa na RPC Mangara na kuwa mbaya zaidi alipokuja Kamuhanda. Walidai kuwa Polisi wa Iringa si waadilifu na wamekuwa wakijiona kama miungu watu.

Waandishi walieleza Kamati, kitu kilichowaudhi sana ni yale majibu yaliyotolewa na RPC baada ya mauaji ya Daud Mwangosi ambayo yalionekana yalikuwa ni ya kupanga ili ukweli usijulikane. Walisema kama si picha zilizotolewa na waandishi wa habari waliokuwepo kwenye tukio, hawadhani kama umma wa Watanzania wangepata ukweli wa tukio hilo.

Walisema tarehe 06 Machi 2012, walifanya maandamano ili kupinga manyanyaso ya Polisi wa mkoani Iringa yaliyopokelewa na Mkuu wa Mkoa. Waandishi wa Habari mkoani Iringa pia walionyesha masikitiko yao kuwa tangu kutokee kwa mauji ya Daud Mwangosi, hawajapokea pole kutoka kwa Mkuu wa Mkoa na watendaji wake wa juu hata kama ni ya “kinafiki”.

Kwa upande wa pili, yaani Jeshi la Polisi, Kamati ilipata taswira tofauti. RPC Kamuhanda alisema kuwa yeye anaona mahusiano ya Polisi na waandishi wa habari kwa ujumla ni mzuri na yeye binafsi amekuwa akikutana na waandishi wa habari takriban kila siku asubuhi saa nne kuwapa habari. Pia aliiambia Kamati kuwa waandishi wa habari walishiriki kikamilifu katika kuripoti michuano ya mpira ya Kikombe cha Kamuhanda yaliyofanyika mjini Iringa.

Msimamo huo pia ulichukuliwa na viongozi wa juu wa kiutawala akiwemo Mkuu wa Mkoa Dkt. Christine Ishengoma, Katibu Tawala wa Mkoa Bibi Getrude Mpaka ambao walisema kuwa hapakuwa na uhasama wowote kati ya Ofisi ya Mkuu wa Mkoa na Waandishi wa Habari. Wote wawili walisema kuwa walimfahamu marehemu Daud Mwangosi na aliteuliwa katika kamati kadhaa za kimkoa ikiwa ni pamoja na ile ya kuandaa Sensa ya Watu na Makazi Mkoani, Kamati ya Masuala ya Katiba ya Mkoa na Kamati ya Kukuza Utalii ya Mkoa.

Kuhusiana na hisia kuwa Mkuu wa Mkoa na watendaji wake hawakujumuika na waandishi katika msiba wa Daud Mwangosi, Dkt. Ishengoma alisema si kweli hawajatoa rambirambi zao kwa kifo cha Mwangosi lakini alitoa pole kwa waandishi wakati ameenda na IGP Mwema kijijini Nyololo na pia kupitia radio katika kipindi kilichotayarishwa na mwandishi wa habari Francis Godwin.

Baada ya kuongea na pande hizo mbili, Kamati imebaini kwamba kuna walakini wa mahusiano kati ya waandishi wa habari na baadhi ya askari polisi mkoani Iringa. Kuhusu madai ya kuwepo kwa orodha ya waandishi watatu (3) ambao jeshi la polisi limepanga kuwashughulikia.

Kwenye tukio la Nyololo ambapo mwandishi wa habari Daud Mwangosi aliuawa, mwandishi wa habari mwengine Godfrey Mushi alipigwa na Polisi na inasemekana kujeruhiwa vibaya na baadaye kukamatwa na Polisi.

Kwa mujibu wa Joseph Senga mpiga picha/mwandishi wa habari wa gazeti la Tanzania Daima ambaye alikuwepo kwenye tukio na kupiga picha, alimuona marehemu akipita nyuma ya gari moja la Polisi ambalo lilikuwa na baadhi ya wanachama wa CHADEMA. Punde tu alimwona mtu amezungurukwa na askari akipigwa lakini hakujua ni nani na yeye aliendelea kupiga picha tukio hilo mpaka nae alipokamatwa na Polisi watatu ambao walimwuliza kama nae anataka aende kuungana na mtu anayepigwa pale.

Senga alisema wakati kipigo kinaendelea, kuna askari mmoja mwenye nyota tatu (OCS Mwampamba) aliteremka kutoka kwenye gari na kwenda pale ambapo Yule mtu aliyekuwa anapigwa huku akiwaambia “mwachieni, mwachieni, namfahamu mimi huyo ni mwandishi wa habari!”

Senga alisema mara alisikia kishindo kikubwa na wale askari ambao walikuwa wanamshikilia walikimbia ndipo yeye akaendelea kupiga picha sasa za marehemu Daud Mwangosi ambaye alikuwa amekwisha sambaratishwa na bomu. Alieleza kuwa alimsikia yule askari ambaye alikuja kumsaidia marehemu Mwangosi akisema “afande wameniuwa”, “afande wameniuwa”, akimwambia RPC ambaye alikuwa karibu nae kwani nae aliumizwa vibaya katika mlipuko huo. Senga aliiambia Kamati wale wote ambao walikuwa wame mzunguka marehemu kama wanavyoonekana kwenye picha alizopiga walikuwepo wakati anapigwa.

Maelezo ya Bw. Senga yanatofautiana sana na yale yaliyotolewa na RPC na OC FFU kuwa Marehemu alimvamia OCS Mwampamba na kuwa wale askari huenda walidhania kuwa mkubwa wao alikuwa amevamiwa ndipo walipoamua kwenda kumsaidia. OCS Mwampamba mwenyewe wakati akihojiwa na Kamati ilipokuwa Mafinga alisema hakumbuki kitu.

Hata hivyo, kwa maelezo ya Bw. Senga, ambayo yanakubaliana na yale ya RPC na OC-FFU, kitendo cha kupigwa na mauaji ya marehemu Daud Mwangosi kilitokea baada ya kuisha ile operesheni ya kusambaratisha mkutano wa CHADEMA na  hapakuwa na mabishano yeyote au purukushani iliyotokea kabla ya marehemu kuzungukwa na kuanza kupigwa.

Kwa minajili hii basi Kamati imeshindwa kubaini baada ya kumalizika operesheni na askari Polisi kuanza kuondoka, kwa nini Mwangosi alishambuliwa kwa kipigo kabla ya kulipuliwa na bomu la kishindo?

Kwa nini kuna maelezo yanayokinzana kati ya Bw. Senga ambaye alikuwa karibu sana na tukio na yale ya RPC na OC-FFU ambao katika maelezo yao kwa Kamati walisema kuwa wao walikuwa mbali kidogo na tukio kwa hiyo hawakuweza kuona kwa dhahiri kilichotokea. Maelezeo ambayo yalirudiwa na viongozi wa juu wa Polisi ikiwa ni pamoja na Kamishna wa Upelelezi (DCI) Robert Manumba na Inspekta Jenerali wa Polisi, Said Mwema katika mahojiano na Kamati.

Uchunguzi wa Kamati haukuweza kupata ushahidi wa kubainisha kama kupigwa kwa waandishi hao kulitokana na njama yeyote ya Polisi kuwashughulikia au ilitokea kwenye purukushani ya vurugu zilizotokea baada ya FFU kuamriwa kutawanya wanachama wa CHADEMA.

Pia Kamati haikupata ushahidi wowote wa kuonyesha kuwa mauaji ya Daud Mwangosi yalikuwa ni ya kupangwa. Kutokana na maelezo ya hapo juu, Kamati inapendekeza yafuatayo:-

-Taasisi za habari zinazosimamia maadili na weledi wa vyombo vya habari, hususan Baraza la Habari Tanzania na Jukwaa la Wahariri wafanye utaratibu unaostahiki za upatanishi kati ya waandishi wa habari, Jeshi la Polisi na uongozi wa mkoa wa Iringa. Hii itasaidia kurejesha uhusiano mzuri kati ya vyombo hivyo muhimu katika mkoa;

-Waandishi wa habari wapewe mafunzo ya jinsi ya kuripoti matukio ya hatari/ghasia;

-Waandishi wa habari wavae vivazi maalum vya kuwatambulisha wakiwa katika matukio hasa kwenye maeneo hatarishi;

- Waandishi wa habari wafanye kazi kwa weledi, uadilifu, uwazi na wasijibainishe na vyama vya siasa;

- Polisi ambao walihusika katika kumpiga marehemu Daud Mwangosi kabla hajauawa wachukuliwe hatua stahiki za kisheria;

- Kamati ya Ushirikiano kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Waandishi wa Habari iliyoanzishwa mwaka 2008 ifufuliwe. Na kamati hizo ziteremke hadi kwenye ngazi ya mkoa kama ilivyokuwa awali.

- Viongozi wa polisi wanapotoa taarifa za tukio, ziwe zimefanyiwa utafiti wa kina ili zisipotoshe jamii.

7.5 Uwepo wa Sheria, Kanuni au Taratibu zinazotoa uwezo kwa Jeshi la Polisi kuzuia mikusanyiko inayoitishwa na Vyama vya Siasa na Mamlaka ya Rufaa ambapo Vyama hivyo havitaridhika na amri hiyo.

Sheria Namba 5 ya 1992 kama ilivyorekebishwa na Sheria Namba 7 ya 2009 inaratibu mahusiano ya kiutendaji kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Vyama vya Siasa. Kwa mujibu wa Sheria hii Jeshi la Polisi limepewa madaraka ya kutoa zuio kwa maandishi na kuweka bayana sababu za kuzuia mikutano au maandamano. Zuio aina hii ni halali kwa mujibu wa Sheria na ni sherti Chama cha Siasa kiheshimu na kutii. Fungu la 11 vifungu vidogo Na 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 na 8 ya Sheria ya Vyama vya Siasa likisomwa pamoja na mafungu Namba 43, 44, 45 na 46 ya Sheria ya Jeshi la Polisi na Auxiliary Forces Act Sura 322 vitatumika kusimamia uendeshaji mikutano ya Vyama vya Siasa ndani ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania.

 Pamoja na kwamba Vyama vya Siasa vinatakiwa kutoa taarifa na siyo kuomba idhini, Jeshi la Polisi limepewa uwezo na madaraka juu ya mikutano hiyo kuhusu kuzuia au kuruhusu na au kutoa maelekezo stahiki, kama vile kupendekeza, na kushauri eneo mbadala na tarehe tofauti ya kufanya mikutano/maandamano.

Aidha kutotii amri/zuio ya Jeshi la Polisi ni kosa la Jinai kwa mujibu wa Fungu la 74 la Sheria ya Kanuni ya Adhabu Sura 16 RE.

Vilevile kwa mujibu wa Fungu la 43 (6) ya Sheria ya Jeshi la Polisi na Auxiliary Forces Act, Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ndiye Mamlaka ya Rufaa dhidi ya amri/zuio linatolewa na Jeshi la Polisi.

Pamoja na kuwepo kwa Sheria hizi mbili bado kuna mapungufu katika uendeshaji na usimamizi wa shughuli za Siasa kwa Msajili wa Vyama vya Siasa. Kwa mfano pamoja na madaraka aliyonayo Msajili wa Vyama vya Siasa ya kukifuta Chama cha Siasa kwenye rejesta ya usajili kwa mujibu wa Fungu la 19 na 20 ya Sheria ya Vyama vya Siasa, kusimamisha utoaji wa ruzuku na matumizi yake, uratibu wa shughuli za vyama hivyo hauko mikononi mwake.

Wadau wanashauri umuhimu wa kuimarisha uhusiano katika shughuli za utendaji kati ya Ofisi ya Msajili wa Vyama vya Siasa na Jeshi la Polisi ili kudumisha utulivu na amani na utii wa sheria bila shuruti kwa upande mmoja na kukuza mfumo wa Demokrasia ya Vyama Vingi vya Siasa kwa upande mwingine.

7.6 Hali ya mahusiano kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Vyama vya Siasa nchini katika utendaji kazi wao na Utii wa Sheria.

Kamati ya Uchunguzi wa Kifo cha Mwandishi wa Habari wa Channel Ten, Daud Mwangosi katika kupata majibu kwa hadidu hii ya rejea, ilizungumza na viongozi wa vyama vya siasa kutoka ngazi za Kijiji cha Nyololo, Wilaya ya Mufindi, Mkoa wa Iringa na Viongozi wa kitaifa jijini Dar es Salaam na viongozi wa dini kutoka ngazi za Kijiji cha Nyololo, Wilaya ya Mufindi na Mkoa wa Iringa.

Kwa ujumla, kila kiongozi wa chama cha siasa wa ngazi zote ambaye Kamati imezungumza naye kuhusu hadidu hii ya rejea, ameelezea umuhimu wa Jeshi la Polisi katika kulinda usalama wa raia na mali zao na wangependa jeshi hilo liachwe huru katika kutekeleza majukumu yake bila ya kuingiliwa na wanasiasa ili lifanye kazi zake kwa weledi na uadilifu.

Hata hivyo taswira iliyojitokeza ni kwamba kuna mgawanyiko wa mtizamo kuhusu jinsi Jeshi la Polisi linavyoshughulikia mikutano/maandamano ya Vyama vya Siasa.

Baadhi ya viongozi wa vyama vya upinzani wanaamini kuwa Jeshi la Polisi linakipendelea Chama cha Mapinduzi na kubinya vyama vya upinzani, huku viongozi wa CCM kutoka ngazi ya kijiji hadi Taifa wakilisifia Jeshi hilo kuwa linafanya kazi yake vizuri na kwa weledi mkubwa.

Mgawanyiko wa taswira kuhusu madai kuwa Jeshi la Polisi kuipendelea CCM hauko tu kati ya vyama vya upinzani na CCM bali pia kwa viongozi wa dini kuanzia ngazi za kijiji, wilaya hadi mkoani Iringa kwa maelezo kuwa hawajasikia hata siku moja mtu anauawa na Polisi kwenye mkutano wa CCM. Mwandishi mmoja alitoa udadisi wake kuwa huwa wanapata shida sana kuandika habari za mikutano ya CHADEMA kutokana na jinsi Polisi wanavyojipanga kwenye mikutano ya chama hicho.

Kudhihirisha umuhimu wa Jeshi la Polisi katika jamii, hata wale wanaolituhumu kuwa linakipendelea CCM, katika kutoa maoni yao kuhusu hatua za kuchukuliwa askari wanaoharibu sifa ya Jeshi hilo, wanapendekeza kuwa askari wahusika wachukuliwe hatua na kuomba Jeshi hilo liendeshwe kwa weledi hasa inapotokea askari akalazimika kutumia silaha kukabiliana na fujo isifikie kuua.

Kwa mfano, Mchungaji Peter Katanga wa Revival Baptist Church, alishauri chombo cha Polisi kisitumike kufanya mauaji, au kisitumike na mtu, watu, au kikundi chochote kufanya matendo yasiyo mazuri kwa jamii kwa sababu chombo hicho kipo kwa ajili ya kulinda usalama wa raia wote na mali zao.

Viongozi wa siasa wengine bila kujali itikadi zao, wameonekana kukerwa sana na tabia ya watu kuuawa wakati Jeshi la Polisi linatuliza ghasia na hii ikiachiwa iendelee inaweza kuleta uvunjifu wa amani katika nchi. Kwa mfano, Mchungaji wa Kanisa la EFATA Nyololo, Mkombozi Kiliwa alishauri Polisi watumie njia zinazofaa kukabiliana na wanaovunja sheria na si kuua.

Pia Mwalimu wa Shule ya Msingi Nyololo, Obby Kimbale, alielezea kutokukubaliana kwake na kitendo cha mauaji ya Daud Mwangosi, alipendekeza elimu ya uraia itolewe kwa jamii nzima vikiwemo vyombo vya dola, viongozi wa serikali, wanasiasa na wananchi kwa ujumla wao ili kila mtu kwa nafasi yake akaelewa namna ya kutimiza wajibu wake ndani ya mfumo wa demokrasia ya vyama vingi.

Kwa upande mwingine, wengi waliotoa maoni yao juu ya mahusiano ya Polisi na vyama vya siasa, pamoja na kulaumu Jeshi la Polisi kutumia nguvu kubwa katika kukabiliana na wafuasi wa CHADEMA, pia waliwalaumu viongozi wa chama hicho, kwa kutotii amri halali ya Jeshi la Polisi hatimaye kusababisha Polisi kutumia nguvu kiasi hicho.

Kitendo cha kuuawa kwa Mwandishi wa Habari, Daud Mwangosi na tabia ya kutokea mauaji katika mikutano ya CHADEMA kimeonekana kuwakera viongozi wengi wa vyama vya siasa kwani wanaamini kuwa Polisi huwa wanatumia nguvu kubwa kupita kiasi ‘wanapotuliza ghasia’ katika mikutano ya CHADEMA.

Katibu wa CCM Wilaya ya Iringa, Zakaria Mwansasu alielezea sababu ya matukio ya namna hii kuwa ni kutokana na mmomonyoko aliouita mkubwa wa maadili hasa katika vyama vya siasa na akashauri viongozi wa vyama vya siasa wakapewa elimu ya uraia.

Maoni mengi ya viongozi wa vyama vya siasa yamejikita zaidi katika hofu ya nchi kuingia kwenye vurugu na kutoka kwenye kisiwa cha amani na hivyo kutoa uashauri kwa viongozi wa vyama vya siasa na Jeshi la Polisi kuweka mbele maslahi ya taifa.

Mchungaji Yokonia Koko wa Kanisa la Kiinjili la Kilutheri Tanzania (KKKT), alielezea ukosefu wa maadili kwa baadhi ya askari Polisi kuwa umetokana na jeshi hilo kuajiri vijana ambao hawana maadili na kwamba watuhumiwa wa mauaji kwenye matukio yanayolihusisha Jeshi la Polisi wakati wa kuzuia fujo katika mikutano/maandamano ya vyama vya siasa wachukuliwe hatua kali ili iwe fundisho kwa askari wengine.

Kasi ya CHADEMA kuendesha mikutano katika sehemu mbalimbali nchini kwa ajili ya kujiimarisha kichama, imepokewa kwa hisia tofauti na vyama vingine vya siasa. Wakati kuna makundi ya watu katika jamii wakidhani kuwa hiyo ni haki yao kama chama cha siasa kinachotaka kukua na kukubalika kisiasa, wengine wanaiona mikutano hiyo ya hadhara ya CHADEMA kama ni kuwapunguzia muda wa kufanya shughuli zao za maendeleo hasa baada ya kipindi cha uchaguzi kumalizika.

Katibu Mkuu wa CCM Wilson Mukama, alishauri kufanyiwa marekebisho kwenye sheria ya Vyama vya Siasa Namba 5 ya mwaka 1992 itakayoweka wazi shughuli za vyama vya siasa baada ya Uchaguzi Mkuu. Alisisitiza kuwa shughuli za siasa baada ya Uchaguzi Mkuu zihamie bungeni kwa wanasiasa kuhoji mipango ya maendeleo ya serikali na matumizi ya rasilimali za nchi na wananchi waachwe wachape kazi zao za maendeleo.

Kuhusu Jeshi la Polisi, Mukama alisema mfumo uliopo wa Jeshi hilo unalifanya lionekane la kitaifa zaidi na kushauri libadilishwe kimuundo ili liweze kutandaa hadi serikali za mitaa kuongeza nguvu katika mpango wa ulinzi shirikishi ulioanzishwa na Jeshi hilo.

Mwanasiasa John Shibuda alizungumzia mahusiano kati ya vyama vya siasa na Jeshi la Polisi kwa kutoa lawama kwa vyama vya siasa kuwa havitoi malezi kwa wanachama wake ambayo yatawafanya wawe waadilifu, wazalendo, waaminifu na watiifu wa sheria.

Alisema vyama vya siasa havina mfumo wa kujihakiki, kujikosoa na kujiwajibisha na akapendekeza kuanzishwa kwa mfumo huo kisheria ambao utawajibisha vyama vya siasa kwa matendo ya viongozi au wanachama wao.

Shibuda alifafanua kwamba sheria anayopendekeza iwe na nguvu ya kutoa adhabu kwa chama cha siasa na kwa kiongozi au mwanachama ambaye atathibitika kuwa ndiyo chanzo cha uvunjifu wa amani.

Kuhusu Jeshi la Polisi mwanasiasa huyo alipendekeza kufanyike kwa marekebisho ya utendaji ili wakuu wa wilaya na mikoa waondolewe nguvu za kiutawala ambazo huwafanya wakati mwingine kutoa maagizo ya kisiasa kwa Jeshi la Polisi na hatimaye kulifanya Jeshi hilo lionekane linatekeleza maslahi ya wanasiasa badala ya kuwa chombo cha kulinda amani.

Kwa ujumla Kamati kutokana na maelezo mbalimbali ya Viongozi wa Vyama vya Siasa na Jeshi la Polisi, imeona kuwa kuna mahusiano hafifu kati ya baadhi ya Vyama vya Siasa na Jeshi la Polisi.

Kwa kuwa taasisi zote hizi ni wadau muhimu wa amani na utulivu nchini, Kamati inapendekeza:

-Kuwe na jukwaa la mazungumzo ya mara kwa mara kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Vyama vya Siasa ili kila upande ujue wajibu wake na wa taasisi nyingine katika kudumisha amani ya nchi na utamaduni wa kuheshimu sheria zilizopo na kupunguza migongano.

-Kuhusu madai kwamba mauaji yanayotokea nchini yaundiwe Tume, Kamati imeona kuwa zipo sheria zinazotoa mamlaka ya kutafiti au kuchunguza endapo kuna mashaka ya kifo hicho.

-Muundo uliopo wa Jeshi la Polisi uangaliwe upya kisheria ili kuziba mianya inayotoa nafasi kwa wanasiasa kulitumia Jeshi hilo kwa manufaa ya kisiasa.

-Nafasi za Mkuu wa Wilaya na Mkuu wa Mkoa kiutendaji ziangaliwe upya ili zisitumike na mhusika kwa ajili ya manufaa ya kisiasa.

-Kwa kuwa Jeshi la Polisi litaendelea kuwa ndiye mlinzi wa usalama wa raia na mali zao, siasa za ubabe kwa vyama vya siasa ziepukwe kwa kuwa zinaleta msuguano usio wa lazima na Jeshi la Polisi

8.0. MAONI NA MAPENDEKEZO:

Kutokana na uchunguzi uliofanyika kupitia mahojiano na Viongozi wa kada mbalimbali, kuanzia ngazi ya Kijiji, Wilaya, Mkoa hadi Taifa, Kamati ina maoni na mapendekezo yafuatayo:

MAONI:

-Kuhusu madai kwamba mauaji yanayotokea nchini yaundiwe tume, Kamati imeona kuwa zipo sheria zinazotoa mamlaka ya kutafiti au kuchunguza endapo kuna mashaka ya kifo hicho.

-Nafasi za Mkuu wa Wilaya na Mkuu wa Mkoa kiutendaji ziangaliwe upya ili zisitumike na mhusika kwa ajili ya manufaa ya kisiasa.

-Kwa kuwa Jeshi la Polisi litaendelea kuwa ndiye mlinzi wa usalama wa raia na mali zao, siasa za ubabe kwa vyama vya siasa ziepukwe kwa kuwa zinaleta msuguano usio wa lazima na Jeshi la Polisi

-Kuhusu operesheni ya uzuiaji wa mkutano wa CHADEMA usio halali Kijijini Nyololo tarehe 02 Septemba 2012, Jeshi la Polisi lilitekeleza wajibu wake ipasavyo na kutumia nguvu sahihi. Operesheni iliyoandaliwa na kufanyika ilikamilika kwa kuwatawanya watu waliofika kwenye mkutano, kukamata baadhi ya Viongozi na wafuasi wa CHADEMA na hali ya utulivu ilirejea kwenye eneo husika.

MAPENDEKEZO

-Mauaji ya mwandishi wa habari Daud Mwangosi yalitokea baada ya operesheni kumalizika, na amri ya kuondoka kwa askari eneo la tukio kutolewa na Viongozi wa operesheni hiyo

-Jamii wakiwemo Viongozi waelimishwe umuhimu wa utii wa sheria, kanuni na taratibu ili kudumisha amani na utulivu hapa nchini. Viongozi wengi walionyesha hofu ya kuliingiza Taifa kwenye machafuko makubwa na uvunjifu wa amani iwapo jamii haitazingatia umuhimu wa kutii sheria, kanuni, taratibu na amri halali za Mamlaka.

-Msajili wa Vyama vya siasa afafanue majukumu ya vikundi vya Ulinzi vya Vyama vya Siasa kama vile Green Guard, Red Brigade, Blue Guard.

-Iwepo programu mahususi ya Elimu ya Uraia nchini ili kujenga uzalendo na kukuza maadili ndani ya jamii wakiwemo viongozi wa kada mbalimbali. Hivi sasa jamii inashuhudia kutoweka kwa uzalendo na kuwepo kwa mmomonyoko wa maadili ndani ya jamii.

Njia zifuatazo zitumike:

- Elimu ya uraia iimarishwe katika mitaala ya elimu kuanzia Shule za msingi hadi Vyuo Vikuu.

- Uamuzi wa kurudisha mafunzo ya Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa kwa vijana utekelezwe mapema.

- Vyama vya Siasa, Madhehebu ya Dini, Tasnia ya Habari na Taasisi zisizokuwa za Serikali zishiriki kikamilifu katika uenezi wa Elimu ya Uraia nchini.

- Kuhimiza uzingatiaji wa weledi katika utendaji kazi kwa mujibu wa taaluma na miongozo inayotolewa kuleta ufanisi. Aidha elimu endelevu sehemu za kazi itiliwe mkazo.

-Kufanya marekebisho ya Sheria ya Vyama vya Siasa Na. 5 ya 1992 ili kuweka wazi shughuli za Vyama vya Siasa baada ya Uchaguzi Mkuu. Lengo ni kuwa Shughuli za Siasa zihamie Bungeni kujadili na kuhoji mipango ya Serikali na matumizi ya rasilimali za nchi. Kwa kufanya hivyo wananchi watapata nafasi kufanya kazi za maendeleo.

-Kuboresha Ofisi ya Msajili wa Vyama vya Siasa nchini, hususan uanzishwaji wa ofisi ngazi ya Mkoa na Wilaya ili kuratibu ushirikiano/mahusiano baina ya serikali (Jeshi la Polisi) na Vyama vya Siasa. Lengo ni kukuza mahusiano na kuondoa mgongano.

-Utaratibu wa kufanya mikutano mara kwa mara kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Vyama vya Siasa, Jeshi la Polisi na Waandishi wa Habari uimarishwe ili kujenga mahusiano mazuri na kupata ufumbuzi wa haraka kwa matatizo yaliyojitokeza.

- Jeshi la Polisi nchini ni chombo muhimu katika ulinzi na usalama wa raia na mali zao. Muundo uliopo wa Jeshi la Polisi uangaliwe upya Kisheria ili kuziba mianya inayotoa nafasi kwa wanasiasa kulitumia Jeshi hilo kwa manufaa ya Kisiasa. Aidha mipango ya kuboresha utendaji kazi kitaaluma iliyopo hivi sasa upewe msukumo stahiki hususan rasilimali watu na fedha.

- Wananchi wahamasishwe kushirikiana na Polisi Jamii na Ulinzi shirikishi. Polis ishirikiane na Serikali za mitaa kufanikisha malengo hayo.

- Jeshi la Polisi liimarishwe ili litekeleze majukumu yake kikamilifu na kujenga mahusiano sahihi kati yake na Jamii, Vyama vya Siasa, Tasnia ya Habari na Asasi zisizo za Kiserikali.

-Taasisi za habari zinazosimamia maadili na weledi wa vyombo vya habari, hususan Baraza la Habari Tanzania na Jukwaa la Wahariri wafanye utaratibu unaostahiki wa upatanishi kati ya waandishi wa habari, Jeshi la Polisi na uongozi wa mkoa wa Iringa. Hii itasaidia kurejesha uhusiano mzuri kati ya vyombo hivyo muhimu katika mkoa.

-Waandishi wa habari wapewe mafunzo ya jinsi ya kuripoti matukio ya hatari/ghasia.

-Waandishi wa habari wavae vivazi maalum vya kuwatambulisha wakiwa katika matukio hasa kwenye maeneo hatarishi.

-Waandishi wa habari wafanye kazi kwa weledi, uadilifu, uwazi na wasijibainishe na vyama vya siasa.

-Kamati ya Ushirikiano kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Waandishi wa Habari iliyoanzishwa mwaka 2008 ifufuliwe. Na kamati hizo ziteremke hadi kwenye ngazi ya mkoa kama ilivyokuwa awali.

-Viongozi wa Polisi wanapotoa taarifa za tukio, ziwe zimefanyiwa utafiti wa kina ili zisipotoshe jamii.

-Kuwe na jukwaa la mazungumzo ya mara kwa mara kati ya Jeshi la Polisi na Vyama vya Siasa ili kila upande ujue wajibu wake na wa taasisi nyingine katika kudumisha amani ya nchi na utamaduni wa kuheshimu sheria zilizopo na kupunguza migongano.

9.0. CHANGAMOTO

Changamoto zilizojitokeza katika Uchunguzi zimegawanyika katika mtiririko ufuatao:-

9.1 Jeshi la Polisi:

- Ukosefu wa Mafunzo endelevu.

- Ukosefu wa Uvumilivu katika utekelezaji wa Majukumu.

-Uelewa mdogo wa Elimu ya Uraia.

- Mmomonyoko wa Maadili.

- Kukosekana kwa uzalendo.

- Ukosefu wa Utii wa Sheria, Kanuni na Taratibu

9.2 Vyama vya Siasa:

- Kukosekana kwa uvumilivu katika kuendesha shughuli za Siasa.

-Kukosekana kwa Elimu ya Uraia

- Uelewa mdogo wa baadhi ya Viongozi wa Vyama kuhusu uendeshaji wa Vyama vya Siasa.

- Ukosefu wa Sera/Mwongozo kwa Vyama vya Siasa kuendesha shughuli za Kisiasa baada ya uchaguzi mkuu.

- Kukosekana kwa Jukwaa linalokutanisha mara kwa mara Vyama vya Siasa na Jeshi la Polisi

- Mmomonyoko wa Maadili.

- Suala la Uzalendo.

- Ukosefu wa Utii wa Sheria, Kanuni na Taratibu

9.3 Jamii:

- Elimu ya Uraia.

- Mmomonyoko wa Maadili.

- Kukosekana kwa uzalendo.

- Ukosefu wa Utii wa Sheria, Kanuni na Taratibu.

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10 HITIMISHO

Hayati Baba wa Taifa Mwalimu Julius Nyerere wakati wa uhai wake aliwahi kusema kuwa, “ili nchi iendelee inahitaji vitu vinne ambavyo ni watu, ardhi, siasa safi na uongozi bora. Watanzania kila mtu mahali pake, tunahitaji kuwa na siasa safi yenye kujenga ustawi, tija, mshikamano, amani, maendeleo na afya kwa taifa letu”.

Utulivu na amani kwa ajili ya mustakabali wa taifa, imekuwa ni kauli mbiu ya viongozi mbalimbali ambao Kamati hii imepata fursa ya kuzungumzia juu ya hali ya siasa na mahusiano yaliyopo baina ya Serikali, (Jeshi la Polisi, Kamati za Ulinzi na Usalama wilaya na mkoa), vyama vya siasa, viongozi wa dini na wananchi.

Wananchi na Viongozi wanataka kuona shughuli za siasa ya vyama vingi inaendeshwa kwa hoja zenye tija badala ya vurugu na utengano. Njia mojawapo ya kukabiliana na hali hii inayojitokeza ni kujenga uzalendo, maadili mema, na mshikamano ili Tanzania iendelee kuwa kisiwa cha amani na utulivu.

Kamati hii inashauri na kupendekeza kuwa maoni haya yazingatiwe na kutekelezwa.

Aidha Kamati imefaidika sana kupata fursa ya kukutana na viongozi mbalimbali kuanzia kijiji hadi taifa na walitoa ushirikiano wa dhati katika kutoa mchango wao wa mawazo. Kamati inapenda kutoa shukrani za dhati kwa Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi Mhe. Dkt Emmanuel Nchimbi (Mb) kwa imani yake kwa wajumbe wa Kamati ya Uchuguzi.